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  Hon. Anita B. Brody, United States District Court for the*
              Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 05-2325
            
MOHAMMAD ELGERGAWI,
                                                       Appellant
v.
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;
PENNSYLVANIA DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF THE
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;
INTERIM OFFICER IN CHARGE OF PITTSBURGH'S SUB-OFFICE
OF US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-01993)
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
         
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 28, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, Circuit Judges, and BRODY,  District Judge*
(Filed March 3, 2006)
OPINION
            
2SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant, Mohammad Elgergawi (“Elgergawi”), appeals from the order of the
District Court granting summary judgment to the defendant immigration officials
(“Government”) denying Elgergawi’s complaint for a declaratory judgment to establish
his eligibility for naturalization in the United States.  
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Elgergawi is a native of Egypt born to a Palestinian father and Egyptian mother. 
He could not secure Egyptian citizenship at birth due to his father’s nationality. 
Elgergawi spent his formative years in both Egypt and in Saudi Arabia, where his father
occasionally had work contracts.  Elgergawi received an undergraduate degree from
Beirut Arab University in Alexandria, Egypt.  In August 1992, following his graduation,
Elgergawi came to the United States on an F-1 student visa to pursue a master’s degree
and enrolled in New Hampshire College but did not attend due to financial constraints. 
Elgergawi moved to Orlando, Florida, to live with a cousin.  After two weeks in Orlando, 
Elgergawi relocated to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he lived with a friend he knew
from Egypt.  In September 1992, Elgergawi applied for asylum in the United States based
on abuse suffered as a Palestinian living in Egypt.  For unknown reasons, his asylum
application was never adjudicated.  
In February of 1995, Elgergawi married Vivienne Mallon, an Irish citizen and
 Elgergawi acquired Irish citizenship in 1998 by virtue of1
his marriage.  His wife remains a citizen of both Ireland and the
United States.  
3
legal permanent resident of the United States.  When his wife became a citizen of the
United States, Elgergawi applied for and was granted status as a legal permanent
resident.   In March 1996, Elgergawi and his wife moved to Orlando, Florida, where he1
worked in the fields of banking, finance, and software development while attending the
University of Central Florida.  In October 2001, Elgergawi pursued a job as a software
consultant at Zayed University in Dubai, one of  the United Arab Emirates.  Elgergawi
officially began working at Zayed University in January 2002.  In March 2002, after
settling their two children in University provided housing in Dubai, Elgergawi and his
wife returned briefly to the United States where they signed a one-year lease for a small
apartment in Pittsburgh.  The family did not furnish the apartment or keep any personal
effects there.   
In October 2002, while visiting Pittsburgh from Dubai, Elgergawi filed for
naturalization with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”).  In
February 2003, Elgergawi returned to the United States to attend a naturalization
interview.  The officer who interviewed Elgergawi determined that his case raised
national security concerns and required further investigation by the Joint Terrorism Task
Force.  After waiting nearly ten months for approval of his naturalization application,
Elgergawi filed this suit in December 2003, requesting a hearing on his application
 The District Court denied the Government’s motion to2
dismiss on the ground that CIS lost its jurisdiction over the claim
once Elgergawi sought relief in federal court.  That ruling is not at
issue here.
 In his brief to this court, Elgergawi focuses on 8 U.S.C. §3
1427(a) and argues that the District Court improperly interpreted
the three-month residency requirement in that section.  The
applicable section is 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), which includes the same
three-month residency requirement and applies to any person
whose spouse is a citizen of the United States.  We have therefore
cited to the latter section.
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), which permits a district court to rule on an application for
naturalization where more than 120 days have passed from the date on which the
examination was conducted and in which no decision has been rendered.  2
Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on the
issue of whether Elgergawi was entitled to be naturalized, with both sides focusing on
whether Elgergawi had satisfied the applicable residence requirements set forth in the
controlling statute and its implementing regulations.  On April 1, 2005, the District Court
granted the Government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Elgergawi failed to
prove that he had resided in Pittsburgh for three months preceding his application for
naturalization, as required.
II.
Elgergawi claims that the District Court erred in two ways in granting the
Government’s motion for summary judgment: 1) the court improperly interpreted 8
U.S.C. § 1430(a)  as imposing a substantive requirement of three months of residence in a3
5state or district preceding an application for naturalization, rather than as a special venue
provision; and 2) the court adopted an improper definition of what constitutes “residence”
under that statute. 
A. Substantiality of the Three-Month Residency Requirement
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), “[a]ny person whose spouse is a citizen of the United
States . . . may be naturalized . . . if such person . . . has resided within the State or the
district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed his application for
at least three months[.]”  The regulation interpreting this provision provides in relevant
part that: 
(a) General. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, to
be eligible for naturalization, an alien must establish that he or
she:
. . . 
(5) Immediately preceding the filing of an application . . . has
resided, as defined under § 316.5, for at least three months in
a State or Service district having jurisdiction over the
applicant's actual place of residence, and in which the alien
seeks to file the application[.]
8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(5).  
Elgergawi argues that the residency requirements set out in both the statute, 8
U.S.C. § 1430(a), and the regulations are designed only to determine the proper venue for
administrative consideration of naturalization applications.  Elgergawi  relies on a
statement published in the Federal Register that accompanied the passage of the
regulations found in 8 C.F.R. § 316.  Because the statement mentions the potential impact
6of the regulation’s jurisdictional residence prerequisite on the filing of an application for
naturalization, Elgergawi contends that the relevant regulation governs only venue, not
substantive requirements for becoming a citizen.  Further, Elgergawi contends that the
Government waived any objection to venue by failing to raise the issue in a timely or
sufficient manner. 
We conclude that Elgergawi’s arguments lack merit.  Both the statute, 8 U.S.C. §
1430(a), and the regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 316.2, set forth requirements that an applicant
must meet to be eligible for naturalization.  Further, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) contains a special venue provision which applies when a party desires review
involving a petition for naturalization.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1447.  Because § 1447 governs
venue, it is unlikely that Congress intended § 1430 to also serve as a special venue
provision.  In making his argument, Elgergawi fails to cite a single case that supports his
contention that either the statute or the regulation at issue should be read as a special
venue provision.  Finally, the statement made in the Federal Register and cited by 
Elgergawi supports the District Court’s holding that the regulation provides substantive
requirements for filing an application for naturalization.  See 8 C.F.R. § 316 (stating that
the new regulations found in part 316 “serve as a clear and concise explanation of the
substantive requirements upon which the INS will base its naturalization
determinations”).  
B.  Residence - 8 C.F.R. § 316.5(a)
7Having concluded that Elgergawi was required to “reside” in the state in which he
filed his application for the three months preceding the filing, we must next decide
whether the District Court properly interpreted the definition of “residence” found in 8
C.F.R. § 316.5(a).   The relevant portion of the regulation provides that “an alien's
residence is the same as that alien’s domicile, or principal actual dwelling place, without
regard to the alien's intent . . . .”    8 C.F.R. § 316.5(a) (emphasis added).
The District Court held, and the Government argues, that the phrase “or principal
actual dwelling place” relates to and describes the word “domicile.”  Govt. Br. 20.  Thus,
the term “residence” is defined as an “alien’s domicile . . . without regard to intent[,]” and
the term “domicile” is further clarified by the phrase “principal actual dwelling place.” 
The Government argues that, because the phrase “or principal actual dwelling place” is
set off by commas, it should be read as an apposition.  An apposition is a phrase “plac[ed]
. . . beside [a word or phrase] so that the second explains and has the same grammatical
construction as the first.”  Id. (citing Webster’s New World Dictionary 35 (2d Concise
Ed. 1982)).  The Government contends that such a reading of the statute best accounts for
the statute’s full text, punctuation, and structure because, if this provision were to be
construed in the disjunctive, there would have been no need to use commas to set off the
phrase. 
The Government also notes that the District Court’s interpretation of the regulation
comports with the definition of residence contained in the INA. The INA defines the term
8“residence” as “the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means
his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.”  8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(33).  The Government continues, if this court were to allow a more expansive
reading of the regulatory definition of the term “residence” to include a separate
definition of the term “domicile,” the regulation would impermissibly expand the scope of
the statute under which it was promulgated.  Finally, the Government, citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984),
argues that the agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations should be entitled
to deference.  
Elgergawi argues that the phrases “alien’s domicile,” and “or principal actual
dwelling place, without regard to the alien's intent” should be read disjunctively. 
Appellant’s Br. 18-22.  Thus, according to Elgergawi, an alien should be able to establish
residence in one of two ways, either by establishing through some physical presence in a
place coupled with an intention to remain in that place a domicile in the state in which the
application was filed (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 48 (1989)), or by showing that his residence was his principal actual dwelling in the
state in which the application was filed. 
Elgergawi concedes that he was not physically present in Pennsylvania during the
relevant time period and that his principal actual dwelling place was in Dubai. Thus, he
argues that he is eligible for naturalization because he was “domiciled” in Pennsylvania,
9that is, he paid rent in Pennsylvania and had an intention to return there.  Elgergawi
supports his argument for a disjunctive reading of § 316.5(a) by pointing to the inclusion
of the word “or” in the text of the regulation and by arguing that an alternative reading
would render the phrase “or principal actual dwelling place” superfluous.  
The District Court’s construction of § 316.5(a) better comports with the plain
language of the regulation and with the definition of residence in the INA.  The insertion
of commas to offset the phrase “or principal actual dwelling place” can only be explained
if this phrase were read in apposition to the term “domicile.”  Rather than making that
phrase superfluous, the agency may have used the phrase to clarify the term “domicile”
and to bring the definition of “residence” in line with the definition at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(33).  Cf. Carlson v. Reed, 249 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Clearly, the plain
language of [§ 316.5(a)] demonstrates that it defines ‘residence’ rather than ‘domicile.’”). 
Finally, Elgergawi’s reading of the provision ignores the fact that the phrase “without
regard to the alien’s intent” clearly applies to the term “domicile.”  Elgergawi admits that
the traditional definition of the term domicile includes some physical presence in a place
coupled with an intention to remain in that place.  Because § 316.5(a) eliminates
consideration of the alien’s intent, Elgergawi would not be able to show that he had
established a domicile in Pennsylvania even if we were to read that provision in the
disjunctive. 
C. Applicability of 8 C.F.R. § 316.5(b)(5)
10
Finally, Elgergawi argues that, even if § 316.5(a) requires him to have established
a principal actual dwelling place in Pennsylvania, he meets the exception to this
requirement under § 316.5(b)(5).  This regulation provides:    
(5) Residence during absences of less than one year.
(I) An applicant's residence during any absence of less than
one year shall continue to be the State or Service district
where the applicant last resided at the time of the applicant's
departure abroad.
(ii) Return to the United States. If, upon returning to the
United States, an applicant returns to the State or Service
district where the applicant last resided, the applicant will
have complied with the continuous residence requirement
specified in § 316.2(a)(5) when at least three months have
elapsed, including any part of the applicant's absence, from
the date on which the applicant first established that
residence. If the applicant establishes residence in a State or
Service district other than the one in which he or she last
resided, the applicant must complete three months at that new
residence to be eligible for naturalization.
8 C.F.R. § 316.5(b)(5). 
The Government argues that Elgergawi’s reliance on this provision must fail
because he never actually established residence at his apartment in Pittsburgh.  Residence
is defined in the statute as the applicant’s principal actual dwelling place.  See § 316.5(a).
A special agent who examined the purported residence found it was “completely vacant,”
there was no furniture or common kitchen items in sight, and the landlord stated he never
knew Elgergawi to keep furniture or other personal items in the apartment.  Elgergawi
admits that his principal place of abode was not in Pittsburgh, but rather in Dubai.  Pet.
 In light of our decision, we do not reach the Government’s4
argument regarding the cumulative length of Elgergawi’s absences
from the United States.
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Br. 23.  Therefore, Elgergawi is not eligible for the exception listed in § 316.5(b)(5).   4
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
